Showing posts with label Investment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Investment. Show all posts

Philippine Economy – (Part V) – Revitalizing the Economy with Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)


Amidst economic reforms that promote import competition, the Philippine economy still possesses restrictive stipulations against FDIs. Three reasons can be cited to argue why this should not be the case. First of all, the liberalization of export incentives to attract FDI gave birth to a successful manufacturing export sector through the introduction of export processing zones. Second, the success of the business process outsourcing (BPO) sector exhibits how encouraging fully owned FDIs can put the country in the forefront of an international industry. And third, for a country where nearly a tenth of its labor force holds passports while working in other countries, more Filipinos will be more comfortable staying at home if more FDI is brought in the Philippines.

The worst problems of the domestic market stem from the restrictions against foreign capital. Limiting investments eliminate competition, lessen efficiency, and encourage monopolistic consolidation of economic power. The 60-40 investment rule discourages the infusion of much needed foreign capital. Current investment incentives also hinder the implementation of public-private participation (PPP) projects, which further promotes monopoly. Liberalizing these rules will allow more FDIs in the country and stimulate higher economic growth.

Furthermore, the presence of FDIs is also required to provide stronger linkages between the export industrial sector and the domestic economy. This need is shown by the operation of Japanese FDIs in other ASEAN countries. China and Thailand both have a domestic procurement ratio of export sales of more than fifty percent (60 percent for China and 53 percent for Thailand), while the procurement ratio of export sales of the Philippines lags to only about 26 percent.

Japanese industries that manufacture products that have high commonality like printers, multifunctional peripherals (MFP), projectors, scanners, and digital cameras can migrate in the Philippines in clusters if the investment environment of the country improves. This endeavour requires effort and there is no room for waiting as other countries are also making efforts to welcome these opportunities – most of them even offer better investment incentives.

The major producers of the aforementioned electronic products have linkages to the supply of raw material inputs that are required to manufacture the final product. This leads to the targeting of manufacturers of products like glass and motor, which are not yet based in the country. There are still a number of Japanese companies that are not yet in the country but whose operations can be vital to the needs of electronics makers. As the market expands further, more investors, both Japanese and international, can join in the intermediate stage of manufactures.

Source:
Sicat, Gerardo, “Philippine Economy – (Part V) – Revitalizing the Economy with Foreign Direct Investments,” Crossroads (Toward Philippine Economic and Social Progress), The Philippine Star, April 11, 2012.

Philippine Economy – (Part IV) – Lessons from Manufacturing Promotion and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs)


Manufacturing is important in enhancing the performance of the industrial sector and the economy as a whole. Sadly for the Philippines, manufacturing has become a weak sector in the economy. The share of manufacturing on output (as measured by the gross domestic product or GDP) declined from 26 percent in 1980 to 21.4 percent in 2010. To foster industrialization, policies that hold back the growth of manufacturing must be changed and manufacturing must be placed on the forefront of growth.

Trade liberalization policies of the past removed trade protectionist measures and introduced competition to domestic producers. However, non-trade protection remained in the form of regulatory and investment incentives policies. BOI investment incentives promoted joint ventures where foreign capital is restricted by the 60-40 equity rule in favor of domestic investors.

The current rules limited the participation of foreign direct investments (FDIs). As such, industrial ventures were directed only to sell to the local market. Industries that use the country’s ample labor resources remain untapped because the manufacturing of raw and intermediate materials could not be set up. Had these rules allowed for a more liberal input of foreign capital, the results might have been more positive for the economy.
Thailand shows a great example of how a more inclusive industrial policy for FDI can develop the domestic market. Even if Thailand started its industrialization two decades later than the Philippines, it allowed 100 percent foreign ventures. They welcomed local and foreign investors alike to set up their enterprises.

Contrary to the perception of some, the attraction of FDIs did not suppress the growth of Thai enterprises. The Thais knew where to effectively position their activities with respect to FDIs. They are well aware of their advantage over foreigners; they set up ventures that supplied or serviced the foreign companies. Over time, this policy promoted a growing intensity of industrial domestic product mix. 

Filipino businessmen, on the other hand, engaged in limited arrangements with foreign partners along the 60-40 rule. This limited their market development potential. They only benefited as long as they had little import competition.

Thai joint venture companies fostered national development even as FDIs grew in size and number. FDIs, on the other hand, created new industries that supported their operations. This resulted into a diverse but linked products and services. Moreover, local Thai companies, joint venture companies with FDI partners, and fully owned FDI companies bought their raw materials from the country. These companies export their products not only to ASEAN countries but also to other countries around the globe. As a result, a more vibrant economy emerged in the country.

In addition, the Thai automobile industry has become the center of the automobile industry in Southeast Asia. The Philippines could have had this title since the progressive car manufacturing concept within the ASEAN region started here. However, what gave Thailand the advantage was the fact that automobile assemblers had greater ease of entry in Thailand than in the Philippines. In fact, full ownership was allowed for investors there. The Philippines, however, was again restricted by the 60-40 rule. Also, compared to what the Philippines required, the Thais promoted a more lenient policy regarding the requirement that foreign car assemblers undertake a progressive increase in the domestic content in the assembly of the automobiles sold in the country. Such policies resulted to the swift entry and expansion of suppliers of automobile assemblers in Thailand.

Source:
Sicat, Gerardo, “Philippine Economy – (Part IV) – Lessons from Manufacturing Promotion and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs),” Crossroads (Toward Philippine Economic and Social Progress), The Philippine Star, April 4, 2012.

Industrial Policy in Export-Oriented Economies: Lessons from the Experiences of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan


The industrial policy of Japan is comprised of three stages: the reconstruction phase, rapid economic phase and post-oil-crisis phase.

During the first phase of industrial policy, direct government regulatory measures were employed. Key industries were developed by directly channelling into government funds and at the same time allocating raw materials, foreign exchange and foreign technology. Publicly-owned financial corporations were also created to support priority industries. Fiscal incentives were utilized and big businesses were divided. This yielded a competitive market structure as well as decision-making autonomy for corporate managers. In the 1950s, international competitiveness was pursued using tools like low interest loans, special depreciation, and tax exemption of raw materials and real property. Moreover, tariff and non-tariff barriers were used to protect specific industries from foreign producers.

In the second phase, the economy underwent a transformation from agriculture to manufacturing and from light to heavy industries. Exports in heavy industries accelerated and real GDP grew. The promotion of specific industries continued while foreign exchange and trade liberalization were implemented. The government also discouraged excessive competition by promoting specialization for certain goods.

During the post-oil-crisis phase, industrial policy shifted its focus from giving priority to maximum economic growth to the improvement of social and economic performance. In response to structural change in the economy, two important adjustment mechanisms were used: the establishment of joint credit funds to purchase scrapped facilities with bank loan guarantee and the establishment of capacity-reduction cartel. Industrial policy relied in market-conforming mechanism and less on active protection and direct regulatory tools. It also encouraged knowledge-intensive and energy-saving industrial structure. Furthermore, the government focused on its role as the coordinator of consultation and consensus formation.

South Korea went through several adjustments in response to the dislocations that were caused by partition and the Korean War. In the 1950s, the country followed an import-substitution industrialization strategy; import controls and a multiple exchange rate system protected the domestic market. In 1964, South Korea adopted an export-oriented industrialization strategy. Reforms included devaluation, expansion of export incentives, trade control relaxation, and import liberalization. Exports were promoted through specific incentives like conversion of export earnings into foreign exchange certificates, privilege to import prohibited items through export earnings, loans at preferential rates, direct cash subsidies, tax exemption of imported goods used for exports, and others. These incentives were given to producers of indirect exports starting 1965. Also, the promotion of infant industries led to the creation of huge conglomerates, known as chaebols.

A new market structure evolved by controlling the inflows of foreign investments and foreign technology and by constraining new industry entrants. Vertical integration and local content regulations were imposed on different industries. However, Korea’s success can be largely attributed to selective intervention, especially in its export performance.

Like South Korea, The Republic of China or Taiwan followed an import-substitution industrialization strategy after the War and then moved to export promotion strategy in the 1950s. Before the turn to the next decade, Taiwan relied on tariffs and quantitative restrictions. It was in 1959 when the export oriented strategy started. Taiwan employed a series of reforms, incentives, and selective intervention policies. Support services were also given by the government as well as industrial estates and duty-free economic zones.

Comparison of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all faced natural-resource constraints. All of them enjoyed successful land reforms, as well as social and political stability. Their governments provided an environment that is conducive for investment. They all adopted consistent policies and formulated supportive measures. Their governments did not compete with the private sector. Vested interest in import substitution was not deemed important. Lastly, all countries shifted from import-substitution to export-promotion.

Japan became a role model for South Korea. Their strong business relations created a highly concentrated industrial structure. On the other hand, Taiwan’s income distribution was more equitable during the period of rapid growth. This was brought by policies that ease small and medium enterprise entry. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea also set preferential rates, while Taiwan employed interest rates that are close to market-clearing rates. Unlike Japan and South Korea, it promoted export-oriented industrialization by setting the exchange rate close to market-clearing rate.  Japan and Taiwan both had stable output and inflation rates; South Korea, on the other hand, experienced less stable prices and inputs due to its monetary policies. In terms of the role played by the government, Japan and South Korea’s governments were very active in controlling private enterprises, while the government of Taiwan provided an environment that is both conducive to growth and the propagation of small and medium enterprises.

Lessons

The performances of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan proves that trade restrictions are not inferior to free trade. Their economic success are explained by their reliance on private enterprises, the establishment of the rule of law, domestic and international competition,  and the creation of institutions to improve technological import capabilities. Japan and South Korea influenced the market by controlling how many firms should there be through rationalization and structural adjustment programs.

One of the most important lessons from South Korea is the involvement of the private sector in the promotion of export. In addition, it efficiently used foreign capital and kept it as a response to favorable export performance. It showed that a successful export promotion policy needs export incentives and a system of export targets. Tariff exemption incentives were administered in such a way that tariffs on import and export production were paid at the same time and then rebated at the time of export. In addition, South Korea effectively used local content regulations.

The fact that South Korea’s development of its heavy industry was not successful yielded the following lessons: 1) the objective must be to meet international competitiveness in the medium-term; 2) information regarding comparative advantage must be continuously sought; 3) detailed industry-specific strategy should be reformulated as needed; 4) a small number of industries must be targeted; and 5) government intervention should not constrain the exploitation of comparative advantage in established industries.

 Taiwan’s experience, on the other hand, proved that in an environment that does not encourage large enterprises, growth and equity can be pursued at the same time. The environment must be one where the government lets market forces work after laying down measures which promote economic take-off. In sum, the three economies that were observed indicate that availment of incentives must be subjected to a definite time horizon and must be based on performance.

Source:
Patalinghug, Epictetus, “Industrial Policy in Export-Oriented Economies: Lessons from the Experiences of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan” Philippine Review of Economics and Business, VolumeXXIX, No. 2 (December 1992), pp. 264-276.

Incentive and Industrial Policy: What Can We Learn from Japan?


According to standard neoclassical economics, markets can encounter inefficiencies when externalities, market distortions and scale economies are present. Even so, economists hesitate to recommend government intervention from fear of making matters even worse. In contrast to this view, Japan has successfully guided its economy especially in areas having to do with scale economies, imperfect competition, and the adaptation of foreign technology. This paper seeks to outline the industrial policy and incentives utilized by Japan as well as the lessons that the Philippines can learn from it.

The Management of Competition in Japan

Japan has maintained control over the economy since the end of World War II. These controls were gradually removed and were replaced by fiscal and monetary policies such as including measures that manage competition, control over particular industries, easy credit from government financial institutions for selected industries, depreciation allowances for specified industries, two-way consultation between government and industry, foreign exchange rationing and quantitative import controls and tariffs, government buying shares in infant industries and public relations measures (Bieda, 1970).

Japan redefined the Anti-Monopoly Act and the Fair Trade Commission in 1952 and strove for a balance between the benefits from competitive and monopolistic market structures. The benefits of the former are well-known while the latter avoids inefficient production scale and duplication of costly activities.

Cartels do not always serve the public interest. In Japan’s pursuance of its anti-monopoly policy, conflicts were encountered between agencies and among political parties. But in contrast to the Philippine experience, a constructive compromise was acquired in the midst of lack of consensus.

Japan did not see competition as the only way to improve economic efficiency. The bureaucracy also played an important role. In fact, the government did not hesitate to intervene and promote the manufacturing sector – an area that is not usually covered by laws protecting the public interest – because doing so will produce economic progress.

Japanese Tax Incentives

Japan used the tax system to control the allocation of resources in the industrial sector. Special depreciation allowances were allowed to be deducted from taxable income for certain firms and many incentives were given to exporters and overseas activities. However, such tax incentives must not be employed without caution. They were sometimes given on the basis of political considerations that have nothing to do with improving market efficiency. In addition, tax incentives are difficult to remove even if they are no longer needed.

Because of this, Japanese fiscal experts became critical of tax incentives. It played a significant role in promoting investments and allocating capital, but they were not sufficient to change the level and composition of investments. It made the tax system more complicated. Some analysts even hypothesize that a reduction of incentives could have been more effective.

Other Instruments of Japanese Industrial Policy

The Japanese government influenced credit allocation which also promoted priority industries. This encouraged private banks to lend to the same priority industries. Also, in the midst of foreign exchange scarcity, industrial policy utilized foreign exchange allocations, tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports, and control of importation of technology. They were used to promote the movement of resources to certain favoured industries. Furthermore, industrial policy involved picking winners, forecasting technological developments, and encouraging firms to achieve scale economies. In addition, two-way communication between The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) and the business sector enhanced MITI’s influence.

MITI believed that scale economies and the choice of technology are the most important factors in international competitiveness. However, since it will not be healthy to have very few firms, MITI also encouraged the growth of firms in high priority industries.

Urging firms to scale efficiency and at the same time encouraging competition can result to excess capacity if promoted industries do not succeed in export expansion. Fortunately, Japanese firms thrived in export expansion. Even though there were firms which lost comparative advantage and those that became successful years after the promotional stage, what the government did was it used financial and fiscal powers to prevent excessive price competition. Depression cartels were formed for the former case while rationalization cartels were used for the latter case. These cartels were administered successfully on the whole.

Firms welcomed government guidance not only because of self-interest; cultural and institutional factors were also involved. Industrial policy were supported by politicians and accepted by voters, showing their sense of patriotism, solidarity and cohesion.

Industrial Policy and the Japanese Miracle

Bieda (1970) presented two views on the government’s role in Japan. The first one sees the Japanese economic system as the “most intelligently dirigiste system in the world” where “the ultimate responsibility for industrial planning for deciding in which directions Japan’s industrial effort should try to go, and for fostering and protecting business as it moves in those directions, lies in the government”. On the other hand, economist such as Okita (1980) and Tsuru (1963) categorized the Japanese economy as a highly competitive market economy. The second view takes the high bankruptcy rates into account, indicating the high level of competency in Japan. This is coupled by the low government expenditures in GNP. Despite this, government guidance still contributed to economic growth by providing channels for including private sector inputs into national plans and by influencing the action and plans of firms. There were also instances where industrial policy did more harm than good, but in sum, Japan’s industrial policy record remains mixed. The strengths of individual entrepreneurs explain why government intervention did not suppress entrepreneurial achievement. It is not likely that economic growth would have been higher if government did less government intervention.

Government intervention provided a stable environment which stimulated private sector growth. Its consistency, the government’s commitment to economic growth, the honesty and competence of the bureaucracy, and the two-way communication between the government and business sector all inspired business confidence, made business planning easier and encouraged investors to use longer planning horizons.

Lessons from the Japanese Experience

It is dangerous for the Philippines to draw inferences from Japan given the huge differences between the two countries. The Philippine experience shows that government intervention did more harm than good for the country. What the country should learn from Japan, however, is its focus on export promotion. Protectionism would eventually contribute to sustainable economic growth.

Government intervention in Japan addressed market failures, consistent with the findings of World Bank. Industrial policy also did well because economic agents were disciplined; the bureaucracy was competent and honest. Some inward-looking policies caused a few drawbacks – some industries were protected for too long – but even critics of Industrial policy in Japan did not think that they did more harm than good.

Critics of Philippine industrial policy would likely think that the system is so bad that political failures even outperform market failures and that intervention must be kept at the minimum. However, this should not hinder the government from promoting exports as well as helping industries which can yield international competitiveness. To do this, the Philippines must have a transparent system which identifies industries and the extent of government support that will be granted to them.

Source:
Medalla, Felipe, “Incentive and Industrial Policy: What We Can Learn from Japan?” Philippine Economic Society, Political-Economic Restructuring and National Development (1994).

Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?


A number of academics and policy makers have speculated whether foreign direct investment (FDI) helps accelerate the economic development process. This paper investigates this statement and tests whether policies that promote FDI make economic sense. It examines whether the benefits of FDI are enough to justify the policy interventions that are seen in practice.

For small open economies, efficient taxation of foreign and domestic capital depends on the relative mobility. That is, if foreign and domestic capital are both mobile internationally, it will be best to expose both types of capital to equal tax treatment. If foreign capital is more mobile, it will be best to have lower taxes on capital owned by foreign residents than on capital owned by domestic residents. If market failures are not present, FDI should not be favoured over foreign portfolio investment. Countries tend to tax income from foreign capital at rates lower than those for domestic capital and to subject different forms of foreign investment to very different tax treatment.

Promotion of FDI in Practice

Existing government policies to promote FDI in G-24 and other countries were summarized using data from the annual editions of Corporate Taxes: A Worldwide Summary by Price Waterhouse. It was observed that policies have different forms. The most common are partial or complete exemptions from corporate taxes and import duties, policies that are usually enacted through legislation. Direct subsidies and other types of concessions which are often negotiated between multinational firms and host governments are also common, but they are hard to document.

It was observed that tax rates in G-24 countries are comparable to the averages for other countries. Also, it was detected that most of the said countries give corporate income tax exemptions to foreign corporations which usually lasts for less than a decade. Others also offer exemptions to foreign corporations on import duties. Even poor countries in Europe have been seen to pursue multinational firms.

While many countries tax domestic income earned by foreign corporations at lower rates than domestic income earned by domestic corporations, the former rates are in most cases above zero in the long run (though often not during the first few years following the establishment of a project).

FDI and Host-Country Economic Performance

Multinational enterprises arise from three types of advantages: a firm must own or control a unique mobile asset it wishes to exploit; it must be cost efficient to exploit the asset abroad in addition to the firm’s home country; and it must be in the firm’s interest to control the asset’s exploitation itself – rather than contracting out use of the asset to an independent foreign firm.

If factor prices are not equalized across countries, then a firm has an incentive to become a multinational in order to exploit differences in factor costs between countries. This would give way to vertical FDI - the creation of a multinational whose country operations specialize each in a distinct vertical stage of production. On the other hand, the case is different when factor prices are equalized across countries but shipping goods abroad are costly. When trade costs are low, a firm will produce all its output in domestic plants and serve foreign consumers through exports. When trade costs are high, it is optimal for the firm to build production plants both at home and abroad, so that it serves domestic consumers from its domestic plants and foreign consumers from its foreign plants (Markusen, 1984). This is a case of horizontal FDI, where multinationals undertake similar production activities in all countries.

The existence of externalities associated with FDI raises the possibility that promoting FDI may be welfare-enhancing. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) suggests that the arrival of multinationals increases an economy’s access to specialized intermediate inputs, which raises the economy’s total factor productivity. Meanwhile, Gao (1999) proposed that the creation of multinational firms spreads industry from more to less industrialized countries, which in turn reduces the industrial concentration in the former. This is similar to Markusen and Venables’ (1999) explanation of the “catalyst” effect of multinationals on a host economy. Multinationals also create forward and backward linkages, as well as worker trainings.

Theory predicts that firms will infiltrate foreign markets using FDI when trade costs are low, firm-level scale economies are high, and plant-level scale economies are low. Firms will also penetrate foreign markets when factor-cost differences between countries are large (through vertical FDI) and when countries are similar in terms of market size and factor cost (through horizontal FDI). Brainard (1997) found that higher trade costs and stronger firm-level scale economies encourage FDI relative to exports, while stronger plant-level scale economies discourage FDI relative to exports. Furthermore, she found that higher host-country taxes encourage affiliate sales over exporting.

The work of Wheeler and Mody (1992) suggests that US outward FDI is higher in countries with larger markets, a large stock of initial FDI, higher quality of infrastructure, and more industrialized economies. The observed correlation between current and past FDI to shows that multinationals are attracted to locations with a larger concentration of industrial firms. This supports the idea that agglomeration economies are associated with FDI.

However, the hypothesis that FDI generates positive spillovers for host economies is weakly supported. While multinationals are attracted to high-productivity countries and to high-productivity industries, there is little evidence at the firm or plant level that FDI raises the productivity of domestic enterprises. Plants in industries with a larger multinational presence appear to enjoy lower rates of productivity growth over time. Little support is given by empirical studies for the idea that promoting FDI is merited on welfare grounds.





Evaluation of FDI in practice

FDI key results indicate that:
        i.            The only reason for choosing FDI over foreign portfolio investment and domestic investment is the existence of market failure that is specific to multinational production;
      ii.            G-24 and other countries offer numerous tax concessions to FDI. This violates the residence principle and causes unequal tax treatment for FDI and foreign portfolio investment;
    iii.            FDI raises national welfare by bringing foreign technology and other foreign resources into an economy because they raise the productivity of domestic factors. But without externalities, there is no justification for taxes or subsidies that are specific to FDI;
    iv.            Externalities associated with FDI may raise or lower national welfare, depending on whether positive productivity spillovers from multinationals more than offset the loss in profits;
      v.            FDI is sensitive to both host-country tax policies and economic conditions (e.g. the education  level of the labour force, overall market size, and the size of the local industrial base); and
    vi.            FDI generates positive spillovers for domestic industries, while multinationals tend to be high-productivity firms that pay high wages.

A simple theoretical model of multinational production was used to derive conditions under which subsidies to FDI would be more likely to raise host-country welfare. It assumes that factors are in inelastic supply. It further specifies that the unit factor demands of the foreign firm may differ from those of the domestic firm. This allows for the possibility that multinationals may have relatively weak or strong linkage effects. Furthermore, it is assumed that a domestic firm’s revenue is increasing in its own output, decreasing in the output of its foreign rival, and increasing (decreasing) in the domestic output of the foreign firm if that firm is a source of positive (negative) spillovers to the industry.

Subsidies to FDI are more justified in the following cases: 1) where multinationals are intensive in the use of elastically supplied factors; 2) where the arrival of multinationals to a market does not lower the market share of domestic firms; 3) and where FDI generates strong positive productivity spillovers for domestic agents. Three cases were used to study the promotion of FDI in practice: General Motors in Brazil; Ford Motor Co. in Brazil; and Intel in Costa Rica.

Empirical evidences indicate that the first and third conditions are unlikely to hold, while the second condition holds. Results show that Brazil’s subsidies to foreign automobile manufacturers may have lowered national welfare. Meanwhile, Costa Rica appears to have been prudent in not offering subsidies in the case of Intel.

There is a need for more research on the host-economy consequences of FDI. Academic literature indicates that countries should be doubtful about claims declaring that promoting FDI will raise national welfare. Policy makers in host countries should presume that subsidizing FDI is unnecessary, unless evidences show that social returns to FDI exceed the private returns. Deviations would be justified only when there is substantial positive spillovers associated with multinational production and when multinationals cannot choose the optimal level of production without a subsidy or other incentives.

Host-country governments still offer multinationals special treatment even if the benefits of FDI for host countries are inadequate to justify FDI promotion policies. This may be because governments feel obliged to offer privileges as multinationals subject their location decisions to bidding. However, instead of validating auctions, international cooperation must be sought among governments to prevent multinationals from obtaining gains associated with their presence. Another reason for pursuing FDI is the self-interests of host-country politicians. Attracting multinationals may benefit those who actively support politicians. It may also fit into certain political strategies. Regardless of the reason, countries must be careful in promoting FDI, until strong empirical evidence indicating that the social rate of return on FDI exceeds the private rate of return is found.

Source:
Hanson, Gordon, “Should Countries Promote Foreign Direct Investment?” G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 9, February 2001, United Nations Publication.